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Abstract
Can severe penalties ”encourage the others”? Using the famous case of the British Ad-
miral John Byng, executed for his failure to recapture French-held Menorca in 1757,
we examine the incentive effects of judicial punishments. Men related to Byng per-
formed markedly better after his unexpected death. We generalize this result using
information from 963 court martials. Battle performance of captains related to a court-
martialed and convicted officer improved sharply thereafter. The loss of influential
connections was key for incentive effects – officers with other important connections
improved little after Byng’s execution or other severe sentences.
∗We thank seminar audiences at the universities of Melbourne and Zurich for comments, and Doug Allen,
Sascha Becker, Peter Leeson, and Nicolas Rodger for helpful suggestions. Haoran Gao, Caitlyn Schwarz




”In this country, it is thought wise to
kill an admiral from time to time to
encourage the others.”
Voltaire, Candide
In 1756, a British fleet under the command of Admiral John Byng was sent to recapture
the Mediterranean island of Menorca from French forces, which had recently occupied it.
After an indecisive naval battle, the British fleet withdrew to Gibraltar. In the court-martial
that followed, Byng was charged with neglecting his duty – he had failed to ”do his utmost”
to recapture the island. In accordance with the Articles of War, he was convicted and
sentenced to death. To the astonishment of almost all observers, King George II refused
to pardon Byng. He was shot on board HMS Monarch on March 14, 1757. Voltaire’s novel
Candide describes the event in a fictionalized exchange: Candide asks ”And why kill the
Admiral?”; Martin replies ”...he did not kill a sufficient number of men himself... It was
proven that he was not near enough [the French Admiral]. In this country, it is thought
wise to kill an admiral from time to time to encourage the others.” (Voltaire, 1759/2005) [our
emphasis]
The phrase ”pour encourager les autres” has passed into everyday parlance. It is typically
used ironically, to argue that someone is being punished to spur greater efforts by others.
While the phrase and concept are famous,1 there is little evidence that ”encouraging the
others” through exemplary punishments works – either in the 18th century Royal Navy
or in general. Altruistic punishment may play an important role in sustaining cooperation
(Fehr and Gächter, 2002). At the same time, punishment and other negative rewards can
crowd-out intrinsic motivation (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004).
When it comes to crime, harsher punishments should deter offenders (Becker, 1968).2
However, the evidence that poor prison conditions reduce crime rates is mixed, and the
disincentive effect of the death penalty is arguably weak (Chalfin and McCrary, 2017).3
In the military itself, there is also no clear support for the notion that ”encouraging the
others” results in better performance (Chen, 2016).
In this paper, we first examine the effect of Admiral Byng’s execution on the behavior of
British naval officers. Using newly-collected data on the combat performance of more than
2,721 captains, we show that men with close ties to Admiral Byng fought much harder after
1Google lists 598,000 results for ”pour encourager les autres”, 6.8 million for ”encouraging the others”,
and Google Scholar references more than 1,600 academic writings using the phrase.
2The idea that punishment serves a utilitarian purpose goes back to the philosophical and legal writings
of Bentham (1830) and Blackstone (1767/2017).
3See Katz et al. (2003); Mocan and Gittings (2006); Chen and Shapiro (2007); Donohue and Wolfers
(2006). One important exception is evidence that greater strictness in sentencing influences criminal behav-
ior by members of family and criminal networks (Bhuller et al., forthcoming).
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his execution than before it. We then use newly-digitized data on 963 court martials of other
officers to show that ”guilty” verdicts in general spurred greater action by those connected
to the officer in question. This holds both for family relations and professional ”followers”
(i.e. men who had served with or under the court-martialed officer previously).
Two mechanisms could be at work. Either the punishment is more salient for those con-
nected to the court-martialed officer, convincing men to take more risks and fight harder –
perhaps because they feel they might be next. Alternatively, the loss of an influential pa-
tron could mean that they have to rely more on performance (and less on connections) for
career progression.4 To pin down mechanisms, we collect data on other patrons of treated
officers. Captains who were connected to other influential officers did not change their
behavior after a connected officer’s court-martial; but those that had no other obvious pa-
tron suddenly began to distinguish themselves markedly more than before. Similarly, if
the court-martialed officer with whom they were connected was more senior, subsequent
performance improved; but if he was junior to the officer in question, there was no change.
These results suggest that ”encouraging the others” worked, but for reasons that are dis-
tinctly different from the general deterrent effect implied by the phrase. Court-martials
of mentors pushed (genetically or professionally) connected officers with few other pa-
trons to perform because they nullified the value of pre-existing connections, increasing
the incentives to win glory.5
1 Historical background
1.1 The Royal Navy and Naval Warfare during the Age of Sail
By 1815, the Royal Navy ruled the waves. From relatively modest beginnings in the 16th
century, it had become by far the largest and most successful navy the world had ever seen,
with close to a thousand ships sailing the seas, manned and maintained by over 125,000
men at its peak. During the Napoleonic Wars, it was crucial for Britain’s eventual triumph.
In naval battle after naval battle, it outfought its enemies, routinely inflicting losses on a
scale of 7:1 or 10:1 on its enemies (Rodger, 2005; Allen, 2002; Robson, 2015). Between 1700
and 1900, the Royal Navy’s victories were crucial in building the largest empire in world
4Some of the gain in performance may reflect a deliberate attempt to find new patrons.
5This finding is similar to the results in Bhuller et al. (forthcoming), but documents the incapacitation
effect stemming from the loss of an influential connection.
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history (Kennedy, 2010).
Many factors contributed to the Royal Navy’s success – but technological advantage was
not one of them. British-built ships were often inferior to French, Dutch or Spanish vessels;
guns were near-identical. Human capital, however, was often superior. Naval officers – in
contrast to those in the army – often came from middle class backgrounds, and had to
pass exams before becoming captains. Noble blood – in contrast to the French Navy, or
the British Army – counted for little in promotion decisions (Rodger, 1986). Britain’s navy
could also draw on large reserves of manpower in the merchant navy.
There is ample evidence that Royal Navy crews were more experienced, and better-disciplined,
than those of other navies, showing superior seamanship and better gunnery (Allen, 2002;
Robson, 2015; Rodger, 1986). Naval battles normally involved groups of battleships (“ships
of the line”) sailing close to each other. Such ships would carry from 50 to over 100 guns.
In engagements at sea, often fought at distances of a few dozen yards, ships would use
broadsides (the simultaneous discharge of cannons on one side) until one of the vessels
was sunk or surrendered.
For an officer’s prospects, both performance and connections mattered. Boys with ”inter-
est” (i.e. connections to high-ranking officers and admirals) would often start their careers
as captain’s servants, aged 12 or so. They would then progress to become midshipmen, and
- after an exam emphasizing navigation, seamanship, and gunnery - be promoted to lieu-
tenant. The key step in a naval career was promotion to post-captain – the commander
of a large warship, of 20 guns or more (Pope, 2013; Rodger, 2005). Only about one third
of lieutenants were eventually promoted. Once a post-captain, all assignments and pro-
motions were principally based on seniority. Men with a poor reputation could, however,
find themselves assigned to unattractive missions, sent to unhealthy islands, or on half-
pay (i.e. as captains without a ship, receiving half their normal pay). Prior to promotion
to post-captain, both employment and promotion prospects were highly uncertain. Perfor-
mance mattered thereafter, too: Fighting prowess as a captain could accelerate promotion
to commodore and admiral, as it did in the case of famous officers like Horatio Nelson.
However, being connected to leading officers was also important for promotion (Voth and
Xu, 2020).
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1.2 The Battle of Menorca
After the outbreak of the Seven Year’s War, French forces landed on Menorca. The Balearic
island was a key outpost of the Royal Navy. The British forces retreated into their fortress,
St. Philip’s Castle. As soon as news of the landing reached London, the Admiralty dis-
patched a British fleet under Admiral Byng. Byng was born in 1704, the son of an admiral
and naval hero, and joined the navy aged 14. Aged 23, he was promoted to captain of a
ship with 20 guns. Thereafter, he commanded battleships for almost two decades, before
becoming an admiral in 1745 (Robson, 2015; Baugh, 2008).
Upon receiving orders to relieve the Menorca garrison and retake the island, Admiral Byng
first sailed to Gibraltar, and then to Menorca. There, the British and French fleets met on
the morning of May 20, 1756. From the outset, Byng had misgivings about the chances of
success. The British had 13 ships of the line, the French 12. The British fleet manoeuvred
into an advantageous position, and the leading ships started to exchange fire with enemy
vessels. However, many of the British ships failed to close with the French after one ship
suffered damage to its mast – following vessels stopped to avoid collision, and did not enter
the battle. Byng’s own flagship did not participate in the fighting at all (Dull, 2007).
The final outcome was that the French fleet withdrew – but Byng did not land the infantry
intended to strengthen the Menorca garrison. At a council of war with his captains, he
decided to return to Gibraltar. Eventually, the British fortress garrison on Menorca surren-
dered to the French. In Britain, there was public outrage at Byng’s failure to recapture the
island. Once in Gibraltar, he was arrested and sent to Britain. A court-martial in January
1757 found him guilty of not “doing his utmost” to defeat the French. At the same time,
the court recommended him to the mercy of the King. After extended public debate, the
King refused to commute the sentence, and Byng was executed aboard HMS Monarch on
March 14, 1757.
1.3 Naval Discipline
In the Age of Sail, many engagements at sea were indecisive. In chance encounters between
ships, captains trying to avoid battle often pointed to their disadvantageous position. In
larger engagements, lines of ships were slow to form up, and battles could be cut short
by the weather. Time and again, captains would decide not to engage because of concern
about being outgunned, short of shot, or in a poor position relative to the wind. Attempts
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to evade battle were common enough for the leading historian of the Royal Navy to ob-
serve:
”The [Royal] Navy during the Seven Years’ War had a real problem of cow-
ardice. It was not so bad as it had been earlier in the century, but it remained
a source of intermittent anguish... and was several times the cause of serious
failures in action... the three ranks in question were admirals, commanders and
masters.” (Rodger, 1986, p.244)
Discipline in the Royal Navy – like all other navies in the Age of Sail – was harsh. Cap-
tains had extensive powers over their men. Floggings were a regular occurrence. Many
violations according to the Articles of War carried the death penalty. Discipline for cap-
tains themselves was also severe. In contrast to common practice in other navies, Royal
Navy regulations in general were carefully designed to force its captains to fight (Allen,
2011). The Articles of War laid down a set of fighting instructions compelling commanding
officers to engage the enemy (see Appendix A.1 for an extract). British captains could be
court-martialed if they failed to attack enemy vessels as long as they were not clearly out of
their own class. While frigates were not required to engage battleships, British ships were
expected to attack and defeat enemy ships even if the latter had 50% greater firepower
(Allen, 2002). Captains who failed to engage in a naval battle without good reason were
routinely court-martialed, convicted, and never served again at sea.6
Court martials were common throughout the age of sail. Loss of ship – whether to the
enemy or shipwreck – automatically resulted in a trial (Hannay, 1914). The court – com-
posed of Royal Navy captains – would question witnesses, hear evidence, and examine
documents before pronouncing its verdict. Most of the accused would be exonerated – a
reflection of a system stipulating automatic court martials for loss of every ship. Convicted
captains could be sentenced to death. Most convictions resulted in milder sentences, but
the captain would routinely be ”broken” – he would lose his seniority, putting him at the
bottom of the list of captains. In effect, he would be banned from ever commanding a navy
ship again.
At his trial, Admiral Byng was judged to have violated the Articles of War. Historians have
emphasized that the rules laid down in the Articles of War, and their stringent application
to officers – including highly ranked ones like Byng – created
”a culture of aggressive determination which set British officers apart from their for-
6A good example is Captain John Williamson, of the Agincourt, who failed to engage during the battle of
Camperdown in 1797 (?).
6
eign contemporaries, and which in time gave them a steadily mounting psychological
ascendancy. ... British officers encountered opponents who expected to be attacked,
and more than half expected to be beaten, so that [the latter] went into action with
an invisible disadvantage which no amount of personal courage or numerical strength
could entirely make up for (Rodger, 1986).”
1.4 An illustrative example
The case of Admiral Byng’s most prominent follower, his flag-captain Arthur Gardiner,
illustrates how ”encouraging others” worked. Gardiner commanded Admiral Byng’s flag-
ship Ramillies at the Battle of Menorca in 1756. He also gave evidence during the court
martial, supporting Byng. Lord Anson, First Lord of the Admiralty, thought that both
Byng and his officers had brought disgrace on the Royal Navy. After the guilty verdict
and execution of Byng, Gardiner was in command of a smaller battleship, the Monmouth,
with 64 guns. In 1758, his ship encountered a French vessel, the Foudroyant, with 80 guns
(Rodger, 1986). To redeem his standing as a naval officer, and despite facing an enemy
with almost twice the firepower of his own ship, Gardiner decided to attack.7 Gardiner
himself was shot and killed during the ensuing battle, but the Foudroyant eventually sur-
rendered.
Captain Gardiner fought a much more powerful ship after Admiral Byng’s conviction. This
case demonstrates that, after Byng was made an example of, at least some of his followers
fought harder. If connections and performance are complements, we should expect this
reaction – an exogenous negative shock to a captain’s position, influence, and prospects of
attractive postings and promotions will incentivize him to find other ways of improving
his standing.
2 Data
Personnel and performance. To construct our officer-level panel, we draw on data from
Threedecks, a web resource featuring detailed information on vessels, crews, and naval
actions. Threedecks constitutes the most comprehensive data source on the personnel
and ships of the Royal Navy and on fighting events during the Age of Sail. 8 Three-
decks has assembled data on 25,229 ships, 33,959 seamen, and 1,022 actions and battles
7The Monmouth fired a broadside of 228 kilograms, whereas the Foudroyant had one of 440 kilograms.
8The Royal Maritime Museum in Greenwich lists it as a standard reference.
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among European sea powers (the major ones being British, French, Spanish, Dutch and
Portuguese).9
Our core dataset is based on work by Voth and Xu (2020) and covers 5,848 British offi-
cers (lieutenants, commanders, post-captains and admirals) and their assignments to 3,904
Royal Navy ships during the years 1690-1849. Because we perform event studies, we limit
the sample to a balanced panel of officers around the court-martials of interest. When
studying the execution of Admiral Byng in subsection 3.1, for example, we transform the
panel into a high-frequency monthly panel, focusiing on the 206 officers active throughout
the period 1756-58. For the analysis of all court-martials, the balanced panel covers 2,721
officers in three year windows around 963 court-martial events.
Outcomes can be readily measured in this setting. Our dataset contains detailed informa-
tion on the number of enemy ships captured or destroyed, the number of military actions
in which a ship participated, and whether the ship itself was captured, wrecked, or sunk.
We follow Voth and Xu (2020) and combine the number of captures, ships destroyed, and
actions joined into a composite measure of performance.10
Measuring connections. We measure connections using pre-determined family ties fol-
lowing the methodology of Xu (2018). In brief, we match the officers with the Peerage
dataset, a genealogical database that contains the family tree data of the British elite. For
any court-martialed officer, we compute the degrees of separation (by consanguinity) to
all officers who are serving around the time of the trial. We define two officers to be con-
nected if their degrees of separation is less than 16. This is the same cut-off used in Xu
(2018) and Voth and Xu (2020). Results are robust to using alternative cut-offs.11 Finally,
we also leverage the rich personnel data to construct a measure of on-the-job ties. We de-
fine two officers to share a tie if they have previously served on the same ship in the same
year.12
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the 206 officers for which we have data around the
execution of Admiral Byng. We compare the differences between Byng’s kins to non-kins
pre-execution (up to 1756) and post-execution (1757-1758). By our measure, 19% of offi-
9These numbers are correct as of September 2018 – the date when we downloaded the relevant data.
10To validate this measure, Voth and Xu (2020) show that higher performing officers are promoted more
quickly to post-captain.
11Xu (2018) contains a detailed discussion of the construction and interpretation of this measure. We later
test the robustness of our findings with respect to this measure.
12Ager et al. (2016) use the same definition to establish ties between WW II fighter pilots.
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cers are connected to Admiral Byng. Given his aristocratic background, this is a reasonable
share.13 On average, Byng’s kins and non-kins have served a comparable number of years.
Prior to his execution, they also do not differ significantly in their capture rate, the number
of enemy ships sunk and actions participated in, or the combined measure thereof (bat-
tle performance). Post-execution, however, Byng-connected officers exhibit significantly
higher capture rates and outperform unconnected kins. Connected captains command
more frequently and are assigned slightly more powerful vessels before Byng’s trial, but
this is no longer true post-execution. Due to Byng’s seniority and influence, his kins, how-
ever, hold higher positions in the navy: those connected to Byng are 18.3% points more
likely to have become post-captains (i.e. be in independent command of warships).
Court-martials. We systematically collected data on court-martialed officers. For each
officer in our dataset, we searched the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography as well
as John Marshall’s Royal Naval Biography – the authoritative historical compilation of naval
careers – for mentions of court-martials. For officers without entries, we conducted an
extensive online search. Overall, we identify 186 court-martials (including the famous
case of Admiral Byng). In 53 of the cases, the court-martialed officer was convicted. To
these we add the large number of automatic court-martials due to loss of a ship.14
The resulting total number of court-martials is 963. Since we are interested in studying the
spill-over effects of the trials on the relatives of court-martialed officers, the main analysis
restricts the total number of court-martials to the subset for which we can compute the
kinship networks. The resulting dataset contains 168 trials, covering the court-martials of
well-connected and more prominent officers. We leverage the full sample when general-
izing the results using on-the-job ties as an alternative measure of connections.
13Byng’s father was George Byng, ennobled as the 1st Viscount of Torrington. He served as Admiral of the
Fleet and Treasurer of the Navy, and was twice elected as the Member of Parliament for Plymouth.
14We assume that, in the absence of information to the contrary, these resulted in acquittals. This assump-
tion does not change our results, and we also report in Table A6 the results without the acquittals following
the loss of a ship.
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3 Results
3.1 Encourager les autres - Admiral Byng
To examine if others were encouraged by punishments, we compare the performance of
connected and unconnected officers, before and after a guilty-verdict and/or punishment
by a court-martial in the Royal Navy. Figure 1 illustrates the effect in the case of Admiral
Byng.15 Prior to March 1757, naval officers related to Admiral Byng did not outperform
their peers. Immediately after his execution, however, the performance of connected offi-
cers spiked, increasing by a factor of 10 for three months. While the differential declines
thereafter, it remains sizeable for the rest of the year. As we know from the case of Captain
Gardiner, tainted by his association with Byng, some officers even two years later tried to
redeem themselves.
We perform a simple balanced difference-in-difference analysis for the period 1756-58 to
quantify the magnitude and establish the statistical significance of our findings. Specifi-
cally, we estimate for outcome yit of officer i in year-month t:
yit = β × Byng kini × Postt + θi + τt + γ
′xit + εit (1)
where yit is the combined number of captures, ships sunk and actions participated in. The
dummy Byng kini is 1 if the officer is connected to Byng.
16 Postt is a dummy that is 1 in the
month following Admiral Byng’s court-martial and execution. θi are officer fixed effects
and τt are year-month fixed effects. xit is a vector of individual controls which we will
discuss subsequently. We cluster the standard errors at the officer-level.
Table 2 shows the regression results. Byng-connected officers do not outperform before
Byng’s execution – nor is there a general change in performance after March 1757 (column
[1]). For connected officers, however, the average performance per month is suddenly 64%
higher than average. The results are similar if we control for year and officer fixed effects
(columns [2] and [3]). As Table 1 shows, officers connected to Byng are more elite and
higher ranked. While the individual fixed effects absorb such time-invariant differences,
15The coefficients are estimated using a flexible version of the specification in Table 2, column [3] where
we allow the effect of the connectedness to Byng to vary for each month.
16The results are also robust to transformations of the dependent variable such as a dummy for any capture,
ships sunk or action, and the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to address the large number of zeros.
We verified the robustness of our results using negative binomial count models (Table A1).
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these level differences could nonetheless interact with the execution of Admiral Byng. In
column [4], we interact all baseline covariates from Table 1 with the Postt dummy. The
results remain virtually unchanged. Finally, we also consider the possibility that the mea-
sure of connectedness to Byng is – at least in part – capturing the general connectedness
to the elite. To that end, we limit the sample to only those officers who are listed in the
elite Peerage dataset (column [5]). Assuringly, we find the same results within the sample
of the British elite. In other words, there is no evidence that those born with high status
in general felt that their standing and status had now suddenly become more insecure,
leading to greater efforts. Instead, the change in performance is specific to men related to
Admiral Byng.
Robustness. The results are robust to different cut-offs for defining connectedness to Ad-
miral Byng. In Figure A2, we report the estimates of Table 2 for cut-offs ranging from 12 to
20 degrees of separation. As expected, the effect declines with the degrees of separation.
The results, however, remain statistically and economically significant throughout. We
also provide robustness checks to ensure that the results are not driven by confounders.
In theory, the greater performance of Byng-connected officers could be driven by more fa-
vorable assignments – either to easier tasks or to more powerful ships. This, however, is
unlikely – relatives of an Admiral executed for cowardice would hardly be favored in their
subsequent assignments. As Table A2, Panel A, column [1] indeed shows, kins of Admiral
Byng are statistically not more likely to command a ship post-execution than non-kins; fur-
thermore, conditional on being assigned a ship, kins of Admiral Byng command equally
powerful vessels, as measured by their gun count (column [2]). Allowing the performance
difference between Byng’s kins vs. non-kins to vary by being given command thus does
not affect the estimates (column [3]).
Another concern is that the observed effect could be driven by the Seven Year’s War (1756-
1763), which falls into the time period of our study. Of course, for Royal Navy captains
to fight successfully, the country had to be at war. But it could be that the inital bout of
naval fighting biases results in our favor. While the fact that the effect only appears in
the immediate aftermath of the court-martial helps alleviate such concerns, we go a step
further and also control for monthly variation in the overall conflict intensity during the
war. As Figure A1 shows, conflict events – as measured by the total number of enemy
ship captures, ships sunk and actions participated – spike during wars but there exists
substantial within-war variation. In Table A3, column [1] we thus allow the performance
gap to vary by the total number of conflict events in a month. Reassuringly, the results do
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not change substantially, suggesting that the effect is indeed driven by connections with
Admiral Byng.
3.2 Court-martials and the encouragement of others
Is “encouraging others” only effective in famous cases like that of Admiral Byng? Byng
was by far the most high-ranking officer to be convicted (and executed) in British naval
history – and his convinction came as a surprise. It is an open question whether similar
effects could follow from the conviction of less-elevated officers. To go beyond a single case
study, we draw on all Royal Navy court-martials during the period 1690-1849. This also
allows us to go beyond kinship connections, and to look at broader measures of social ties –
e.g. whether two officers have previously served on the same ship. Overall, we identify 963
court-martial trials. While this allows us to generalize the findings, a drawback of using
lesser known cases is that details about the trials are less abundant. For example, we do
not have the exact dates of all court-martial trials, allowing us to only conduct the event
study at an annual level.17
Empirically, we proceed as before, comparing relatives to non-relatives before and after the
court-martial trial. We pool all court-martial cases by ”stacking” each event study, which
we confine to a balanced 3 year window around each trial. For court-martial case c, officer
i and the year around the court-martial event t = {−3,−2, ...3}we estimate:
yict = β × Kinic × Postct + γ × Kinic × Postct ×Guiltyc + θic + τct + κK(i,t) + εict (2)
where Kinic is now a dummy if the officer i is connected to the court-martialed officer c.
Postct is a dummy that is 1 in the year of the court-martial trial and thereafter (t ≥ 0).
Guiltyc is a dummy that is 1 if the court-martial c resulted in a guilty verdict, and 0 other-
wise. This distinction is important as the average effect of a court-martial trial will mask
substantial heterogeneity. While Admiral Byng was found guilty and executed, the major-
ity of court-martial cases ended in acquittals, providing an additional source of variation.18
17As Table A4 shows, however, the effects of Admiral Byng’s execution also hold on the yearly-level. This
alleviates concerns that the level of analysis might affect the results.
18Convictions are an endogenous outcome, but we do not find much evidence that – conditional on a court-
martial – those connected to guilty officers look substantially different from acquitted officers (see Table A5.),
other than that they tend to command smaller ships and are less likely to have lost a ship (most officers who
lost a ship were acquitted).
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Since officers can be exposed to multiple court-martial trials, we constrain the comparison
to each officer × court-martial trial using the officer × court-martial FEs θic. τct are court-
martial specific fixed effects for each year around the court-martial trial. κK(i,t) are fixed
effects denoting the years of tenure k = K(i, t) for officer i in year t. We cluster the standard
errors at the officer × court-martial level.
The regression results are reported in Table 3. Kins of court-martialed officers outperform
post-trial when the accused officer was found guilty (column [1]). In contrast, kins of
court-martialed officers underperform when the accused officer was acquitted.19
Next, we go beyond the kinship connections by looking at on-the-job ties that were es-
tablished through officers serving on the same ship. In the Royal Navy, the relationship
between the captain and the first lieutenant was a key pathway for patronage.20 The use of
on-the-job ties also has the added advantage that we can extend our sample substantially,
going beyond those for whom peerage data on family ties is available. As column [2]
shows, our main results are confirmed using on-the-job ties as an alternative measure of
social connections. The size of these effects are large, but smaller than in the case of Admi-
ral Byng. There, the guilty verdict led to an average performance increase by 118%, relative
to the mean of the dependent variable.21 Here, the average gain for all court-martials for
relatives was 20%, and 50% for professional ”followers”. Finally, we combine both mea-
sures – connectedness by kin and previous service – to construct a composite measure that
takes the value of unity if the officer was either a relative or had previously served with the
officer. As column [3] shows, the results remain comparable. As before in subsection 3.1,
we provide robustness checks to ensure that the results are not driven by a more favorable
assignment for kins of guilty officers post-execution (Panel B, Table A2, columns [1]-[3],
or confounded by wars (Table A3, columns [2]-[4].)22
Mechanisms. Two mechanisms could explain the observed incentive effect. If punishment
is more salient for those connected to the court-martialed officer, a guilty ruling may in-
centivize related officers to exert more effort. Alternatively, a guilty ruling may weaken –
19These results are consistent with models of career concerns where connections and performance are
substitutes (Jia et al., 2015; Xu, 2018).
20Many ties were formed even earlier. Since captains were responsible for manning their own ships, they
often took the sons of friends and relatives on board at an early age. We have no systematic data on such
connections.
21To ensure the magnitudes are comparable, we use the annual specification (Table A4, column [3]) to
compare the coefficients.
22Again, is unlikely that kins of guilty officers would be favored after the court-martial verdict.
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or in the case of Admiral Byng even destroy entirely – the influence of an existing connec-
tion. The loss of a powerful patron may thus induce officers to exert more effort in order
to distinguish themselves. To investigate the channels, we split the sample by whether the
court-martialed officer is senior or junior to the officer he is connected with, as measured
by the years of seniority. If the increased performance is driven by the loss of a patron,
we expect the observed effects to be driven by those officers whose guilty kin is indeed
in a position of power. Consistent with the favoritism channel, the effect of a guilty court-
martialed kin is concentrated among officers whose senior kin was convicted (column [4]).
In contrast, officers with convicted junior kin do not perform significantly better (column
[5]).
If the greater performance is driven by an attempt to compensate for a weakened social
tie, this incentive should be less for those who can draw on other, powerful connections.
In columns [6]-[7], we split the sample by whether the officer is connected to the Admi-
ralty in a given year – the apex of the naval hierarchy.23 As predicted, the incentive effects
are driven by officers not connected to the top of the Admiralty. In contrast, exposure to
a court-martialed and guilty kin has no effect on performance of related officers who are
themselves directly connected to the Admiralty. Figure 2 shows the effect visually: while
there is an increase in performance for officers with no ties to the Admiralty who see a kin
convicted, there is no effect for officers in the same situation, but with ties to the Admi-
ralty.24
4 Conclusions
The Royal Navy in its heyday was a large and complex organization. While nominally run
from the Admiralty in London, its ships sailed the seven seas, and often operated thou-
sands of miles from home waters. Dispatches could take months to arrive. Under such
circumstances, naval leaders in England were unable to control and direct naval warfare
directly; instead, they had to rely on the judgement and motivation of men on the spot. Ac-
cordingly, the Royal Navy used both rewards and punishments to align incentives (Allen,
23Following Voth and Xu (2020), the measure is a dummy that is 1 if the officer is either connected to the
Admiral of the Fleet or the First Lord Admiralty – the two highest ranked commanders – by less than 16
degrees of separation (by consanguinity).
24We are unable to conduct the same sample cuts as before using Admiral Byng alone. Due to his excep-
tional seniority, almost all connected officers are junior to him. As the fifth son of George Byng, 1st Viscount
Torrington, Byng was also exceptionally well connected, thus providing too little variation.
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2002).
Our evidence suggests that in settings with such severe principal-agent problems, strict
punishment can ”encourage others”. Performance in general did not improve after court
martials – only convictions are associated with greater performance, and only those cap-
tains related to the officer in question changed their behavior. This does not mean that
there was no general effect of the navy’s strict rules, but they were not heightened by mak-
ing punishment more salient in general.
There is a second, less obvious channel through which exemplary punishments can ”work”.
By removing any chance of support through connections and patronage by a senior offi-
cer, connected juniors were forced to prove their worth in battle – the positive effect on
performance is strongest for those who do not have other influential acquaintances, who
can substitute for the support of the court-martialed officer. Similar effects should be un-
surprising in other organizations where informational asymmetries are large, and careers
depend on the support and mentoring of senior colleagues – such as in academia, banking,
and the law.
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Notes: Reporting the performance gap between kins vs. non-kins of Admiral Byng in a balanced window
around March 1757, the date Admiral Byng was executed. The coefficients are estimated using an augmented
version of Table 2, Column [3] which allows the difference-in-differences to vary by month around the day
of execution. The figure plots 90% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the officer-level.
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(b) No ties to Admiralty
Notes: Reporting the performance gap between those connected vs. unconnected to guilty vs. acquitted court-martialed officers in a balanced
three year window around the year of court-martial, broken down by those who held no ties to the Admiralty (Panel a) and those who held ties
to the Admiralty (Panel b). Connected is defined as either holding kinship ties or having served together on a ship in the past. The coefficients
are estimated using an augmented version of Table 3, Columns [6]-[7] which allows the triple differences to vary by each year around the
court-martial trial. Reporting 90% confidence intervals. Standard errors clustered at the officer × court-martial level.
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Table 1: Officer characteristics - Byng kin vs. non-kin
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Pre-execution Post-execution
Unconnected Connected Diff. Unconnected Connected Diff.
(N = 166) (N = 40) [2]-[1] (N = 166) (N = 40) [5]-[4]
Years of tenure 16.596 15.925 -0.671 18.584 17.925 -0.659
(1.471) (1.471)
Post-captain 0.499 0.682 0.183** 0.798 0.941 0.142**
(0.074) (0.061)
Years commanding 6.048 8.575 2.526*** 2.493 2.625 0.131
(0.926) (0.170)
Ship guns 30.619 36.117 5.498* 43.281 47.546 4.264
(3.124) (4.164)
Capture rate 0.188 0.151 -0.037 0.311 0.795 0.483***
(0.072) (0.122)
Actions seen 0.057 0.116 0.058* 0.103 0.082 -0.020
(0.031) (0.048)
Ships sunk 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.006 0.016 0.010
(0.001) (0.009)
Battle performance 0.155 0.185 0.030 0.385 0.875 0.490***
(0.048) (0.121)
Notes: Comparing individual characteristics of officers by connectedness to Admiral Byng, before (pre
1757) and after the execution (1757-1758). The sample comprises all serving officers who are active
around the execution of Admiral Byng (1756-1758). The years of tenure is the total number of years served
in the Royal Navy. Post-captain is a dummy that is 1 if the officer is a post-captain. Years commanding
is the total years an officer has commanded a ship. Capture rate is the average number of enemy ship
captures per year. Actions seen is the average number of actions participated per year. Ships sunk is the
average number of enemy ships sunk per year. Battle performance is the mean number of enemy ship
captures, ships sunk and actions participated (average battle performance). Finally, peerage is a dummy
for whether the officer is in the peerage dataset (a measure of eliteness). Standard errors are clustered
at the officer-level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 2: Execution of Admiral Byng and the performance of his kins
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Battle performance
Mean of dep. var 0.0285 0.0285 0.0285 0.0287 0.0417
Post execution 0.003
(0.005)
Byng kin -0.004 -0.004
(0.007) (0.008)
Byng kin × Post execution 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.056*** 0.058***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019)
Year ×Month FEs Y Y Y Y
Officer FEs Y Y Y
Baseline controls × Post Y Y
Sample All naval officers Peerage
Observations 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,344 1,944
Notes: Unit of observation is the officer × year × month. Balanced panel includes all officers serving
between 1756 and 1758. Post execution is a dummy that is 1 after March 1757, the date Admiral Byng was
executed and 0 otherwise. Byng kin is a dummy that is 1 if the officer is connected to Admiral Byng by
less than 16 degrees of separation (by consanguinity) and 0 otherwise. Baseline controls comprise pre-
execution characteristics as shown in Table 1. These are (all computed up to 1756, the year before Byng’s
execution): the years of tenure; a dummy for whether the officer is a post-captain; the total years an officer
has commanded a ship; the mean number of enemy ship captures, ships sunk and actions participated
(average battle performance); a dummy for whether the officer is in the peerage dataset (a measure of
eliteness). In Column [5], the sample excludes officers who are never connected by limiting the sample
to only those officers who are listed in the Peerage dataset. The dependent variable Battle performance is
the sum of enemy ship captures, enemy ships sunk, and the number of actions an officer participated in
in a given month. Standard errors are clustered at the officer-level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 3: The performance and ties to court-martialed officers
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Battle performance
Mean of dep. var 0.301 0.179 0.179 0.191 0.174 0.146 0.324








Connected × Post court-martial -0.036*** 0.003 -0.056*** -0.019* -0.020
(0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.017)
× Guilty 0.059*** 0.050* 0.039 0.062** 0.015
(0.018) (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) (0.049)
Court-martial FEs
× Year around court-martial FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
× Officer FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Tenure FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample Pooled sample Court-martialed is Ties to Admiralty
Senior Junior No Yes
Observations 157,927 3,251,468 3,251,468 960,117 2,264,608 2,631,894 610,624
Notes: Unit of observation is the officer × court-martial × year. Sample includes all officers serving in a
three year window around the year of each court-martial (balanced). Post court-martial is a dummy that
is 1 in the year of the court-martial and thereafter. Kin is a dummy that is 1 if the officer is connected to the
court-martialed officer by less than 16 degrees of separation (by consangunity) and 0 otherwise. Job tie
is a dummy that is 1 if the officer and the court-martialed officers have served on the same ship in the
past. Connected is a dummy that is 1 if the officer is either connected by kinship tie (Kin) or through a job
connection (Job tie). Guilty is a dummy that is 1 if the court-martialed officer was judged to be guilty, and
0 if the officer was acquitted. The dependent variableBattle performance is the combined number of enemy
ship captures, enemy ship sunk and actions participated in a given year. For column [1] the sample is
restricted to only officers who are found in the Peerage dataset (and for whom we can therefore compute
the kinship ties). In Columns [4]-[5], the sample is divided by officers who are of lower seniority than
the court-martialed officer (court-martialed is senior) and those who outrank the court-martialed officer
(court-martialed is junior). In Columns [6]-[7], the sample is divided by officers who are connected to
the Admiralty (either to the Admiral of the Fleet or the First Lord Admiralty) by less than 16 degrees
of separation (by consanguinity), and those who are unconnected to the Admiralty. Standard errors are
clustered at the officer × court-martial level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Online appendix – not for publication
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Notes: Showing the total number of fighting events (captures, ships destroyed and actions participated)
over time. Fighting events cluster around naval wars, and variation in captures drives the overall pattern.
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Notes: Estimating Table 2, column [3] using different cut-offs for maximum consanguinity to define Byng
connectedness. Reporting 90% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the officer-level.
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Table A1: Performance results – Transformations and negative binomial regression
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Battle performance
Any performance Inv. hyperb. sine Neg. binomial
Mean of dep. var 0.024 0.104 0.023 0.125 0.058 0.440
Byng kin × Post execution 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.907**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.355)
Connected × Post court-martial -0.016*** -0.023*** 0.027*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.015)
Connected × Post court-martial × Guilty 0.018*** 0.031*** 0.164***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.042)
Year ×Month FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Officer FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample Byng All Byng All Byng All
Observations 7,416 3,251,468 7,416 3,251,468 3,636 1,322,884
Notes: Unit of observation is the officer × year × month. In Columns [1], [3], and [5] the balanced
panel includes all officers serving between 1756 and 1758. In Columns [2], [4], and [6] the balanced
panel includes all officers serving around a three year window of each court-martial using the combined
kinship and on-the-job tie. Post execution is a dummy that is 1 after March 1757, the date Admiral Byng
was executed and 0 otherwise. Byng kin is a dummy that is 1 if the officer is connected to Admiral Byng by
less than 16 degrees of separation (by consanguinity) and 0 otherwise. Connected is a dummy that is 1 if
the officer is either connected by kinship tie (Kin) or through a job connection (Job tie). In Columns [1]-[2]
the dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the officer captured, sunk or participated in any action in
a given month. In Columns [3]-[4] the dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation
of the combined number of enemy ship captures, enemy ships sunk, and the number of actions taken
part. The dependent variable Battle performance is the sum of enemy ship captures, enemy ships sunk,
and the number of actions an officer participated in in a given month. Standard errors are clustered at
the officer-level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A2: Performance of kins of court-martialed officers – Assignment
Panel A: Admiral Byng - family ties [1] [2] [3]
Command Guns Performance
Mean of dep. var 0.094 3.654 0.041
Byng kin × Post execution 0.046 0.086 0.069***
(0.032) (0.132) (0.082)
Year ×Months FEs Y Y Y
Officer FEs Y Y Y
Interacted control Command
× Byng kin
Observations 1,944 174 1,944
Panel B: All court-martials [1] [2] [3]
Command Guns Performance
Mean of dep. var 0.460 3.601 0.179
Connected × Post court-martial -0.034*** -0.030** -0.050***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
Connected × Post court-martial × Guilty 0.031 0.035 0.089**
(0.033) (0.052) (0.037)
Court-martial FEs
× Year around CM FEs Y Y Y
× Officer FEs Y Y Y
Tenure FEs Y Y Y
Interacted control Command
× Conn. × Guilty
Observations 3,251,468 1,462,239 3,251,468
Notes: Unit of observation is the officer × year × month in Panel A and officer × court-martial × year
in Panel B. Sample includes all officers serving between 1756 and 1758 (Panel A) and all officers serving
around a three year window of each court-martial using the combined kinship and on-the-job tie (Panel
B). Post execution is a dummy that is 1 from 1757 onwards, the year Admiral Byng was executed and 0
otherwise. Byng kin is a dummy that is 1 if the officer is connected to Admiral Byng by less than 16 degrees
of separation (by consanguinity) and 0 otherwise. Kin is a dummy that is 1 if the officer is connected
to the court-martialed officer by less than 16 degrees of separation (by consanguinity) and 0 otherwise.
Job tie is a dummy that is 1 if the officer and the court-martialed officers have served on the same ship in
the past. Connected is a dummy that is 1 if the officer is either connected by kinship tie (Kin) or through
a job connection (Job tie). In column [1], the dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the officer was
given command over a ship. In column [2], the dependent variable is the (log) total number of guns
of the assigned ship. In column [3], the dependent variable Battle performance is the combined number
of enemy ship captures, enemy ship sunk and actions participated in a given year. Standard errors are
clustered at the officer-level in Panel A, and the officer × court-martial level in Panel B. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A3: Performance of kins of court-martialed officers – War-interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Battle performance
Mean of dep. var 0.0285 0.300 0.179 0.179
Byng kin × Post execution 0.069***
(0.020)
Kin × Post court-martial -0.033***
(0.011)
Kin × Post court-martial × Guilty 0.056**
(0.028)
Job tie × Post court-martial -0.049***
(0.013)
Job tie × Post court-martial × Guilty 0.093**
(0.037)
Connected × Post court-martial -0.036***
(0.007)
Connected × Post court-martial × Guilty 0.048***
(0.018)
Year ×Months FEs Y
Officer FEs Y
Court-martial FEs
× Year around CM FEs Y Y Y
× Officer FEs Y Y Y
Tenure FEs Y Y Y
Interacted control Total perf. × War × Kin War × Job War × Conn.
Byng kin × Guilty tie × Guilty × Guilty
Observations 1,944 157,927 3,251,468 3,251,468
Notes: Unit of observation is the officer × year × month in column [1] and officer × year in columns
[2]-[4]. Sample includes all officers serving between 1756 and 1758 (Column [1]) and all officers serving
around a three year window of each court-martial (Columns [2]-[4]). Post execution is a dummy that is 1
from 1757 onwards, the year Admiral Byng was executed and 0 otherwise. Byng kin is a dummy that is 1
if the officer is connected to Admiral Byng by less than 16 degrees of separation (by consanguinity) and
0 otherwise. Kin is a dummy that is 1 if the officer is connected to the court-martialed officer by less than
16 degrees of separation (by consanguinity) and 0 otherwise. Job tie is a dummy that is 1 if the officer
and the court-martialed officers have served on the same ship in the past. Connected is a dummy that is
1 if the officer is either connected by kinship tie (Kin) or through a job connection (Job tie). In column
[1], we interact the Byng kin dummy with the monthly total number of fighting events (combined num-
ber of captures, enemy ships sunk and actions participated). In columns [2]-[4], we (triple) interact a
dummy that is 1 in a year of war with Kin, Post court-martial and Guilty (and job tie, and the combined
connectedness measure, respectively). The dependent variable Battle performance is the combined num-
ber of enemy ship captures, enemy ship sunk and actions participated in a given year. Standard errors
are clustered at the officer-level in column [1] and at the officer× court-martial-level in columns [2]-[4].
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A4: Execution of Admiral Byng and the performance of his kins - Annualized data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Battle performance
Mean of dep. var 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.371
Post execution 0.403***
(0.047)
Byng kin 0.040 0.042
(0.028) (0.028)
Byng kin × Post execution 0.292** 0.288** 0.336*** 0.436**
(0.132) (0.131) (0.126) (0.199)
Year FEs Y Y Y
Officer FEs Y Y
Sample All naval officers Peerage
Observations 1,391 1,391 1,391 420
Notes: Unit of observation is the officer × year. Sample includes all officers serving between 1756 and
1758. Post execution is a dummy that is 1 from 1757 onwards, the year Admiral Byng was executed and
0 otherwise. Byng kin is a dummy that is 1 if the officer is connected to Admiral Byng by less than 16
degrees of separation (by consanguinity) and 0 otherwise. In Column [4], the sample excludes officers
who are never connected by limiting the sample to only officers who are found in the Peerage dataset. The
dependent variable Battle performance is the combined number of enemy ship captures, enemy ship sunk
and actions participated in a given year. Standard errors are clustered at the officer-level. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A5: Officer characteristics - All court-martials - Connected vs. non-connected
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Guilty (58 trials) Non-guilty (905 trials)
Unconnected Connected Diff. Unconnected Connected Diff. DiD
(N = 23, 496) (N = 1, 927) [2]-[1] (N = 427, 533) (N = 12, 166) [5]-[4] [4]-[7]
Years of tenure Pre 18.522 20.143 1.621*** 18.150 19.746 1.596*** 0.025
(0.267) (0.103) (0.284)
Post 22.486 24.115 1.629*** 22.098 23.724 1.625*** 0.003
(0.267) (0.102) (0.281)
Post-captain Pre 0.595 0.790 0.194*** 0.592 0.783 0.191*** 0.002
(0.011) (0.004) (0.012)
Post 0.681 0.873 0.192*** 0.682 0.866 0.184*** 0.008
(0.010) (0.004) (0.011)
Years commanding Pre 1.266 1.530 0.264*** 1.385 1.590 0.205*** 0.058*
(0.030) (0.012) (0.033)
Post 1.722 1.913 0.191*** 1.822 1.957 0.134*** 0.056
(0.039) (0.015) (0.042)
Ship guns Pre 47.680 54.690 7.009*** 48.356 53.944 5.588*** 1.421*
(0.694) (0.270) (0.746)
Post 49.912 59.267 9.354*** 50.643 57.696 7.053*** 2.301***
(0.683) (0.261) (0.727)
Capture rate Pre 0.096 0.189 0.093*** 0.126 0.226 0.100*** -0.006
(0.07) (0.003) (0.009)
Post 0.095 0.218 0.123*** 0.115 0.203 0.087*** 0.036***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.008)
Actions seen Pre 0.036 0.066 0.029*** 0.053 0.093 0.040*** -0.010**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
Post 0.044 0.084 0.039*** 0.052 0.086 0.033*** 0.005
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
Ships sunk Pre 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.003 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Post 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Battle performance Pre 0.135 0.261 0.126*** 0.183 0.326 0.143*** -0.017
(0.009) (0.004) (0.011)
Post 0.143 0.309 0.165*** 0.171 0.295 0.124*** 0.041***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.009)
Notes: Unit of observation is the officer× court-martial event. Comparing average individual character-
istics of officers by connectedness to court-martialed officer (guilty vs. non-guilty), before (3 years) and
after (3 years) the execution . The sample comprises all serving officers who are active around each of
the 963 court-martial trials. The years of tenure is the total number of years served in the Royal Navy. Post-
captain is a dummy that is 1 if the officer is a post-captain. Years commanding is the total years an officer
has commanded a ship. Capture rate is the average number of enemy ship captures per year. Actions seen
is the average number of actions participated per year. Ships sunk is the average number of enemy ships
sunk per year. Battle performance is the mean number of enemy ship captures, ships sunk and actions
participated (average battle performance). Finally, peerage is a dummy for whether the officer is in the
peerage dataset (a measure of eliteness). Standard errors are clustered at the officer-level. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A6: Performance of kins of court-martialed officers – excl. acquitted for ship loss
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Battle performance
Mean of dep. var 0.272 0.167 0.167 0.181 0.157 0.138 0.290








Connected × Post court-martial -0.003 0.043** -0.035** -0.020 -0.038
(0.011) (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.029)
× Guilty 0.026 0.010 0.018 0.064** 0.031
(0.020) (0.032) (0.027) (0.029) (0.054)
Court-martial FEs
× Year around court-martial FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
× Officer FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Tenure FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample Pooled sample Court-martialed is Ties to Admiralty
Senior Junior No Yes
Observations 63,441 638,920 638,920 271,323 361,971 513,667 123,648
Notes: Unit of observation is the officer × court-martial × year. Sample includes all officers serving in a
three year window around the year of each court-martial (balanced), but is now restricted to the subset
of core court-martial trials and excluding the court-martials that resulted in an acquittal following the
loss of a ship. Post court-martial is a dummy that is 1 in the year of the court-martial and thereafter. Kin
is a dummy that is 1 if the officer is connected to the court-martialed officer by less than 16 degrees of
separation (by consangunity) and 0 otherwise. Job tie is a dummy that is 1 if the officer and the court-
martialed officers have served on the same ship in the past. Connected is a dummy that is 1 if the officer
is either connected by kinship tie (Kin) or through a job connection (Job tie). Guilty is a dummy that is 1
if the court-martialed officer was judged to be guilty, and 0 if the officer was acquitted. The dependent
variable Battle performance is the combined number of enemy ship captures, enemy ship sunk and actions
participated in a given year. For column [1] the sample is restricted to only officers who are found in
the Peerage dataset (and for whom we can therefore compute the kinship ties). In Columns [4]-[5], the
sample is divided by officers who are of lower seniority than the court-martialed officer (court-martialed
is senior) and those who outrank the court-martialed officer (court-martialed is junior). In Columns [6]-
[7], the sample is divided by officers who are connected to the Admiralty (either to the Admiral of the
Fleet or the First Lord Admiralty) by less than 16 degrees of separation (by consanguinity), and those
who are unconnected to the Admiralty. Standard errors are clustered at the officer× court-martial level.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Appendix
Extract from the Articles of War, Royal Navy, 1661-1866
A.1: Articles of War, No. 10 Every flag officer, captain and commander in the
fleet, who, upon signal or order of fight, or sight of any ship or ships which it
may be his duty to engage, or who, upon likelihood of engagement, shall not
make the necessary preparations for fight, and shall not in his own person, and
according to his place, encourage the inferior officers and men to fight coura-
geously, shall suffer death or such other punishment, as from the nature and
degree of the offense a court martial shall deem him to deserve; and if any per-
son in the fleet shall treacherously or cowardly yield or cry for quarter, every
person so offending, and being convicted thereof by the sentence of a court
martial, shall suffer death.
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